Five Years From Wirecard, Europe’s Shorts Are Still Unloved

Short selling ought to have gotten easier in Europe since Wirecard AG filed for insolvency five years ago this week. The collapse spectacularly vindicated the Financial Times, which nailed the accounting scandal, and the hedge funds that had bet against the stock. But regulation continues to foster a bad environment for short sellers. Europe should beware of letting their craft die.

The supervision of short selling gets more stringent as you move east from the US. One major issue is the disclosure of short positions. The US favors aggregating these for public consumption. The UK is moving toward the same model. But in the European Union, individual positions of 0.5% or more must be revealed.

(Shorting is the sale of borrowed stock, aiming to repurchase it later when the price has fallen, profiting on the difference.)

Some might say individual short disclosure is useful information for the market as whole. But the costs of granular transparency outweigh the benefits. Exposing a hedge fund’s short in a stock may lead other investors to draw false conclusions. The market may automatically assume there’s a problem with the company in question even through the short could just be a hedge in some more complex investment. The risk is that the natural process of price discovery is hindered, not helped.

Alternatively, suppose a hedge fund has identified good reasons a company is overvalued. If the disclosure of the short pushes down the stock price, the hedge fund won’t make as much money on a well-placed negative bet if it later expands its position. So short sellers have to target larger companies to make money, or, where targeting smaller companies, be sure the downside is very large. That limits the shorts’ investable universe.

Add to this the specter of retaliation by the target company, or others with a vested interest in the stock going up.