Apple Grandmaster Tim Cook Is Playing 3D Chess With AI

I come not to bury Tim Cook, but to praise him. Last week’s announcement that the Apple Inc. CEO is handing the job to hardware chief John Ternus in September has been met by assessments questioning “whether the company is prepared for a future beyond the iPhone” and how Apple’s lagging performance in artificial intelligence is “raising questions about whether Cook should lead from here.” Cook seemingly built the world’s most valuable company but fumbled his final act. Maybe so. Or maybe the man who created trillions of dollars in shareholder value is still seeing a few moves ahead.

The critiques didn’t start last Monday. Thirteen months ago, John Gruber, a long-respected Apple commentator, wrote “Something Is Rotten in the State of Cupertino.” Apple, he said, had promised a personalized Siri it couldn’t deliver and run ads for features that still don’t exist. The Cupertino, California-based company, Gruber wrote, had squandered credibility it had spent two decades building.

Apple’s self-inflicted humiliation is undeniable. It just didn’t seem to matter to customers. The iPhone 17 marked Apple’s best launch ever. It shipped 247 million iPhones in 2025, took 20% of global unit share, and collected most of the industry’s profits. Siri remains a joke next to ChatGPT or Claude. If customers were picking phones based on their AI capabilities, Apple’s sales bonanza could never have happened.

Cook’s 15 years of discipline have given Apple control of the most valuable choke point in consumer technology and made the iPhone the most profitable product in history. That discipline also let him resist the pressure to go for broke on AI. Not because AI doesn’t matter, but because dominating AI may be impossible. And trying would detract from what Apple already commands. Just because a technology is important doesn’t make concentrating on it the right move. To see why, look at a mistake former Microsoft Corp. CEO Steve Ballmer made 17 years ago.

Ballmer launched Bing in 2009, convinced that search was too important to cede and that Microsoft’s cash could fund its catch-up. It lost $5.5 billion in just its first two-plus years. Fifteen years later, Bing has only about 5% share in global search while Google has roughly 90%. Search was valuable - just not to Microsoft. And $5.5 billion was only the dollar cost. It also took Microsoft’s focus away from things like mobile and tablets and kept it in a search war it never came close to winning.