Big Time Change

Today we continue anticipating 2026, this time shifting for the first part of the letter from economic issues to geopolitics before making some of my personal general forecasts.

Economics and geopolitics are closely related. Geopolitics is about the way national leaders interact with their counterparts, but economic trends also define and constrain their goals.

The most obvious intersection is in international trade. Last week President Trump threatened new tariffs on several European countries who were resisting his (inexplicable, at least to me) desire to buy Greenland. I have no idea where this is going but it’s a good example of why we can’t ignore geopolitics. Their words and actions have direct impact on the economy, the financial markets and our investments.

Below I’ll share the latest thoughts from some of the best thinkers I know. For geopolitics, that means George Friedman, Ian Bremmer and Ray Dalio. But I want to whet your appetite with a brief comment from Peter Boockvar.

“The world is changing big time in front of our eyes, the direction of global trade flows is morphing and diversifying, and investors need to have a global lens when investing in the coming 5-10 years as it’s not going to be just about the US, the S&P 500 and the Mag 7. At the same time, gold is now becoming the most important global reserve currency.”

Peter’s point is well taken. The US now accounts for something like two-thirds of global stock market capitalization. Naturally, many investors worldwide have most of their risk assets here – especially passive index investors. And many non-US stocks depend on US markets. The results have been pretty good but may not remain so. Both trade flows and capital flows are changing.

Ray Dalio has an interesting point on that, which we’ll talk about below. But let’s start with George Friedman, who expects a major change in what is probably today’s most important international rivalry.

Radical Change

George Friedman’s Geopolitical Futures is one of my best sources. (I have known George for well over 20 years. He is a close friend.) He’s been tracking world trends for decades and isn’t afraid to make specific forecasts. George also has a fascinating theory of socioeconomic and institutional cycles. Both are set to peak in the next few years, with likely major effects on the world order.

But George also sees another big change coming even sooner. In short, he thinks 2026 will be the year when the US and China set aside their economic and military rivalries. In his view, the two governments really have no choice. They need each other too much to let the current disputes fester.

In his 2026 Forecast, George describes how China emerged as a great power in the wake of Russia’s post-Soviet decline. The US no longer had to resist Russia but had a new imperative to challenge China’s growing power, both economic and political.

George calls this “a normal process” but thinks it will evolve further in 2026.

“China and the U.S. are already engaged in military and economic competition. Although both have substantial military capabilities, neither benefits from going to war with the other because, ignoring the fact that neither can be assured of victory, they depend on each other economically. China needs the U.S. to buy its products, and it has always relied on Western investment to fuel its economic growth. The U.S. needs to import cheap products for consumers and downstream industries to control inflation, and it needs to divert investment into more innovative and profitable economic sectors.

“Put simply, the U.S. can’t maintain hostilities with a country on which it depends economically. Neither can China. Given this reality, Washington had to rationalize its relationship with Beijing without engaging in outright conflict. Its method for doing so was tariffs, the imposition of which created a serious weakening of the economy in China, raised unemployment and created severe weaknesses in its real estate and financial sectors.

“It also created economic problems in the U.S. by increasing the price of consumer goods. The effect on the Chinese economy was more significant than on the American economy. The solution, then, will be two-fold. First, the United States and China will reach an agreement to ease military tensions. Second, the U.S. will remove or at least moderate tariffs.”

He goes on to describe a potential compromise that would let the US and China resolve their different positions on Taiwan. I know, hard to imagine, but George sees a way it could happen.

With Taiwan off the table, the world could see major changes in the near future.

“This would establish a radical new global geopolitical system: a bipolar world with two powers not engaged in either economic or military confrontation. (Considering what happened after World War II, this kind of change isn’t unprecedented.) If such an agreement was reached between the U.S. and China, there would be serious challenges to overcome, but the world would be anchored again, and the risk of conflict would be dramatically reduced.”

This redefined relationship between the world’s two largest powers would have follow-on effects in various countries and regions. George describes many of them in the rest of his 25-page annual forecast, which I highly recommend reading. You can get your own copy by subscribing to Geopolitical Futures. It is well worth the very reasonable price.

Before we move on from China, let’s recognize that it is an economic powerhouse, and in much the same way that the rest of the world looks at the US because we have significance, we need to pay attention to China because they are important in the global economy. My friend Dr. Michael Pettis who is an economics professor for the last few decades in Beijing summarizes his latest longer report this way:

“China’s economy ended 2025 much as it began—with an overreliance on a growing trade surplus and non-productive investment to drive growth. A sharp decline in the latter over the year saw quarterly GDP growth decline steadily from a very strong 5.4% in the first quarter of the year to 4.5% in the last quarter.

“Beijing will almost certainly do everything it can to revive growth in fixed asset investment in early 2026, but because property investment is almost sure to continue declining, and because it has become harder than ever to justify a surge in infrastructure investment, I expect much of this investment growth to occur in the non-involuted manufacturing sectors. These are the sectors in which foreign competitors are going to be under intense global pressure in 2026.

“The biggest question mark in 2026, as it was in 2025, is the evolution of China’s trade surplus. If it continues to grow strongly, this will reduce pressure on Beijing to increase investment and, with it, China’s high and rapidly rising debt burden. If, on the other hand, external pressures force a contraction in China’s trade surplus, Beijing will set off an even faster rise in China’s debt burden as it unleashes even more investment to prevent growth from slowing.

“If all of this sounds like it might be the same story I have been discussing in my reports all last year, that’s because it is. In spite of rising worries about how an unsustainable reliance on debt and trade surpluses is needed to keep growth at targeted levels, nothing fundamental has changed in the way Beijing manages the Chinese economy.

“In the end, we are still stuck with the same old set of conditions. If the US is able to stabilize and reduce its trade deficit, either surplus countries (which mainly means China) will have to go through the very painful process of reigning in their trade surpluses, or someone else (and this mainly means Europe) will have to go through the very painful process of replacing the US as the main absorber of global excess saving. I don’t know which it will be, but this is just arithmetic.”

As I’ve been saying for years, China is increasingly important in the global economy. But it is not a one-way street. They have significant debt, demographic and “domestic tranquility” issues. Not unlike the US. Both countries are constrained and both need to work with each other because of their own internal issues. Not doing so is a real problem.