Oil Shock: Will The Fed Intervene (Part 2)

Last week, we discussed the risk of an oil shock leading to a recession. To wit:

“After more than three decades of watching oil markets upend economies, one pattern keeps repeating: investors learn the wrong lessons from the last shock. The 1973 OPEC embargo taught us that geopolitical disruptions are temporary. That lesson then got everyone killed, financially speaking, in 1979. The 2003 Iraq War produced only a mild oil bump and no recession, so traders got comfortable. Then 2008 happened. Today, with Brent crude having spiked over 60 percent since U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began in late February, the same dangerous reasoning is circulating again. That narrative is that this ‘event” is manageable and will resolve quickly. If that is the case, then the economy will absorb it.

That may indeed be the case. However, the conditions that determine whether an oil shock becomes a full recession are specific, quantifiable, and worth examining with clear eyes. That is what this analysis does.”

chart 1

That article digs into the plumbing behind oil shocks and recession, and exposes why, over the years, I’ve learned to distrust the loudest voices in the room. Right now, some of the most prominent macro commentators, the “Persistent Purveyors of Doom,” are making a variation of the same argument: the Strait of Hormuz closure is not merely a serious risk of an oil shock and recession; it’s the beginning of the end. Markets will crash within weeks. Stocking up on essentials is the rational response. The global financial system, already fragile, cannot survive what’s coming.

I certainly can understand the appeal of that thesis. The disruption is genuinely unprecedented. Roughly 20% of global oil and LNG now sit stranded behind a military blockade. Furthermore, the secondary effects on fertilizer prices, food inflation, and petrochemical supply chains are real and compounding. This is, as they say, “not nothing.” But ‘this is serious’ and ‘this is the worst crisis in anyone’s lifetime’ are two very different claims. The evidence, as we will discuss today, supports the first one far more than the second.

chart 1

The catastrophist argument rests on a critical hidden assumption: that the global economy, central banks, and governments sit passively while a supply shock plays out. History doesn’t support that assumption — not once.

In 1973, the Arab oil embargo removed roughly 6% of global oil supplies from the market. Painful, yes. Civilizational collapse, no. Markets adjusted, alternative suppliers ramped up, and policymakers, however clumsily, responded. In 1990, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait spiked oil prices by nearly 80% in three months. Within six months, prices had reversed almost entirely as supply alternatives emerged and the military situation resolved. Even in 2008, when oil hit $147 per barrel, the story wasn’t that oil destroyed the financial system. The financial system had already built its own bomb. Oil just lit the fuse faster.

What we’re seeing today follows the same pattern. The IEA has already authorized the release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves, the largest emergency release in history. Saudi Arabia rerouted production through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu port on the Red Sea. The U.S. military launched an active campaign to reopen the strait on March 19th. These are not the actions of a world sitting passively in the path of an unstoppable freight train. They’re the messy, imperfect, and historically consistent responses of a system under stress. More crucially, it is doing what systems under stress do: adapting.

quote