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Results 451–500
of 519 found.
Changes in the Inflation Rate Matter as Much to Investors as the Level
by Bill Hester of Hussman Funds,
It is clear from February's inflation data that there was a broad increase in price levels last month, especially for goods used during the early stages of production. The Producer Price Index rose 5.6 percent from its level a year earlier, up from 3.6 percent in January. On a month-to-month basis, the PPI rose 1.6 percent, doubling its recent pace. That increase was partially fueled by higher food prices, which makes up about a fifth of the overall PPI. Commodity prices tracked within the PPI Index rose 8 percent from a year ago, up from 5.6 percent last month
QE2 - Apres Moi, le Deluge
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
As rules of thumb go, "the trend is your friend" historically performs better than "don't fight the Fed". While the market tends to perform better when both are true, the exception is the overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yields syndrome, which is uniformly negative regardless of the random subset of historical data one examines. There is certainly a tendency for "unpleasant skew" featuring a persistent series of marginal new highs for some period of time, but on average, those are ultimately overwhelmed by steep and abrupt losses that finally clear this syndrome.
This Is, Because That Is
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The market action of the past two weeks contrasts with the generally uncorrected advance of recent months. I suppose it's possible for investors to characterize the recent decline as a "panic" if they press their noses directly against their monitors, but in that case, they really do have a short memory. The pullback has been negligible relative to the action of the past several months, and is indiscernible in the big picture. As of Friday, the market remained in an over valued, bullish, rising-yields syndrome that has typically been cleared much more sharply than anything we saw last week.
An Uneven Global Recovery - Lingering Effects of the Credit Crisis
by Bill Hester of Hussman Funds,
The health of the global recovery depends on which country it is viewed from. When compared to the decade ending in 2007, a majority of developed countries are growing more slowly, have higher rates of unemployment, and have higher levels of inflation. There are exceptions. Notably, Germany is growing at twice its long-term average, with very low relative levels of unemployment. Stock market investors are showing growing sensitivity to differences in macro-economic risks. These may soon be further aggravated by monetary policies from the major central banks that are about to diverge noticeably
Anatomy of a Bubble
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Over the past decade, investors have seen near-parabolic advances in a variety of assets, followed by crashes. These have included dot-com stocks (which peaked and crashed well before the general market peak in 2000), technology stocks, housing, commodities, and stocks in a variety of emerging markets. These experiences have made investors somewhat more attuned to the destructive potential for speculative bubbles in various assets, but has also created something of a "casino economy" where a great deal of resources are directed in hopes of participating in these bubbles.
Quantitative Easing and the Iron Law of Equilibrium
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
If you think about equilibrium, it helps to clear up all sorts of fallacies that people hold about the financial markets. For example, the currency and money market securities that are held by investors will - in aggregate - never "find a home" in any other form or market. If one takes their cash and tries to buy stock, they get the stock and the seller gets the cash. Nothing disappears, and nothing is created. The money-market securities held by investors is not a reflection of "liquidity looking for a home," but is a measure of how borrowers are on short-term sources of credit.
Cash or Credit - Implications for the Financial Markets
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
From the standpoint of prospective investment returns, it is important to recognize that the main effect of quantitative easing has been to suppress the expected return on virtually all classes of investment to unusually weak levels. It's widely believed that somehow, QE2 has created all sorts of liquidity that is "sloshing" around the economy and "trying to find a home" in stocks, commodities, and other investments. But this is not how equilibrium works.
December 2010 Semi-Annual Report
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
For the third time in a decade, the Federal Reserve has embarked on a policy that addresses structural economic problems by provoking speculation in asset prices. The first two attempts were ultimately followed by stock market declines greater than 50% each. As we enter 2011, the stock market remains in what we view as an already strenuously overvalued advance, which has driven our estimates for S&P 500 Index total returns to less than 3.2% annually over the coming decade. My expectation is that this attempt to create ?illusory prosperity? will end no better than it has in the past.
Rich Valuations and Poor Market Returns
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
At present, my view on monetary policy is that the inflation outlook following the completion of QE2 will be quite unstable, because small changes in interest rates are likely to induce very large changes in the willingness of individuals to hold base money. Any external upward pressure on interest rates beyond a fraction of a percent will have to be rapidly offset by a large reduction in the outstanding monetary base in order to avoid a deterioration in the value of money relative to goods and services (i.e. inflation).
Misquoting Keynes
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The famous quote attributed to John Maynard Keynes - "the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent" - is a favorite of speculators here. Actually, I very much agree with this observation, provided that it is correctly understood. Solvency is always a function of debt, and it's extremely important for investors to recognize that when you take investment positions by borrowing on margin, you'd better use stop-losses, because the debt obligation stays intact even if the investment values decline.
Mapping the Molecular Pathway of Autism
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
In recent years, much of the Hussman foundation's research has been centered on autism. Meanwhile, the finance research has been centered on "ensemble methods" to integrate the information from multiple data sets, and to better measure both risk and uncertainty*. As it happens, statistical methods can be adapted to approach difficult problems in both genetics and finance. So as we developed various approaches to integrate multiple data sets in our finance research, it was natural to extend those methods to deal with genetics data.
Sixteen Cents: Pushing the Unstable Limits of Monetary Policy
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Completing the Fed's planned purchases under QE2 will require a decline in 3-month T-bill yields to just 0.05% in order to avoid inflationary pressure. Otherwise, liquidity preference will not expand enough to absorb the addition to base money, even if we assume GDP growth at 4%. Given the extreme stance of monetary policy, the avoidance of inflationary pressures increasingly relies on a very persistent willingness by the public to hold the outstanding quantity of base money in the financial system. Small errors will have surprisingly large consequences. This is not a stable equilibrium.
Borrowing Returns from the Future
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
It will come as no surprise that we continue to anticipate poor 10-year total returns for the S&P 500 over the coming decade. Our present estimate is about 3.3% annually, which includes dividends. That is about 1% less than the 10-year total return that we estimated just a few months ago, but this makes senses.
"Illusory Prosperity" - Ludwig von Mises on Monetary Policy
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Perhaps more than any other economist, Ludwig von Mises got the theory of money and credit right, because he made distinctions between various forms of money and credit that are often conflated by other theorists. The amount of real physical investment in the economy is, and must be, precisely equal to the amount of output not allocated to consumption but instead to savings. Unlike many other economists, Von Mises not only recognized this identity, but carried it through to what it implied for monetary policy.
A Fed-Induced Speculative Blowoff
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Why are Treasury yields rising despite hundreds of billions of Treasury purchases by the Federal Reserve? There are two possibilities in the current debate. One is that the Fed's policy of purchasing Treasuries has scared the willies out of the bond market on fears of higher inflation, and that the policy is a failure. The other is that the policy has been such a success at boosting the prospects for economic growth that interest rates are rising on anticipation of a better economy. From our standpoint, neither of these explanations hold much water.
Things I Believe
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
1) Investors dangerously underestimate the risk of an abrupt and possibly severe equity market plunge. 2) Agreement among "experts" is not your friend. 3) Downside risk tends to be elevated precisely when risk premiums and volatility indices reflect the most complacency. 4) We did not avoid a second Great Depression because we bailed out financial institutions...
Warning - An Updated Who's Who of Awful Times to Invest
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
In recent weeks, the U.S. stock market has been characterized by an overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yields syndrome that has historically been hostile to stocks. Last week, the situation became much more pointed. Past instances have been associated with such uniformly negative outcomes that the current situation has to be accompanied by the word "warning."
A Most Important Rule
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
A decline in bond prices has modestly improved expected returns in bonds, but not yet sufficiently to warrant an extension of our durations. Precious metals have become more overbought, and while we are sympathetic to the long-term thesis for gold, intermediate term risks are now elevated. Finally, we have observed a further deterioration in market conditions for stocks.
House on Ice
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
If our policy makers had made proper decisions over the past two years to clean up banks, restructure debt, and allow irresponsible lenders to take losses on bad loans, we would be quickly on the course to a sustained recovery. Unfortunately, however, we have built our house on a ledge of ice.
Outside the Oval / The Case Against the Fed
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Ever since the Bear Stearns bailout, I've been insistent that the Federal Reserve is increasingly operating outside of its statutory boundaries. Ensuring the legality of Fed actions is not a Democratic issue, a Republican issue or a Tea Party issue. Rather, it is about whether we want America to function as a representative democracy.
The Cliff
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
We estimate that the S&P 500 is priced to achieve sub-5% returns, albeit with significant risk, for every horizon out to a decade. Treasury securities are clearly priced to deliver similarly low returns. It's possible that internals will improve sufficiently to shift the expected return/risk profiles we observe in stocks, bonds and precious metals. For now, we are tightly defensive.
Bubble, Crash, Bubble, Crash, Bubble...
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Given that interest rates are already quite depressed, Bernanke seems to be grasping at straws in justifying QE2 on the basis further slight reductions in yields. By irresponsibly promoting reckless speculation and illusory "wealth effects," the Fed has become the disease. The economic impact of QE2 is likely to be weak or even counterproductive. Even though the S&P 500 is substantially below its 2007 peak, it is also strenuously overvalued once again.
Lessons From a Lost Decade
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
If the past decade has a lesson for investors, that lesson should have two components. The first is that valuations matter. Although valuations often have little impact on short-term returns over periods of less than a few years, they are undoubtedly the single best predictor of long-term market returns. Moreover, high valuations are ultimately followed by far deeper periodic losses than emerge from low valuations. Put simply, greater risk does not imply greater reward if the risks that investors take are overvalued and inefficient ones.
Bernanke Leaps into a Liquidity Trap
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The belief that an increase in the money supply will result in an increase in GDP relies on the assumption that velocity will not decline in proportion to the increase in monetary base. Unfortunately for the proponents of 'quantitative easing,' this assumption fails spectacularly in the data - both in the U.S. and internationally - particularly at zero interest rates. Once short-term interest rates drop to zero, further expansions in base money simply induce a proportional collapse in velocity.
The Recklessness of Quantitative Easing
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
With continuing weakness in the U.S. job market, Ben Bernanke confirmed last week what investors have been pricing into the markets for months - the Federal Reserve will launch a new program of quantitative easing, probably as early as November. Further attempts at QE are likely to have little effect in provoking increased economic activity or employment. This is not because QE would fail to affect interest rates and reserves. Rather, this policy will be ineffective because it will relax constraints that are not binding in the first place.
No Margin of Safety, No Room for Error
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Over the past 10 years, the S&P 500 has achieved a total return, including dividends, averaging -0.03 percent annually. Over the past 13 years, the total return for the S&P 500 has averaged just 3.23 percent. These poor returns were entirely predictable during the late 1990s based on the historical relationship between valuations and subsequent returns. What's more, current valuations suggest similarly poor returns over the next five to seven years.
Economic Measures Continue to Slow
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The latest evidence from a variety of economic measures continues to suggest deterioration in U.S. economic activity. Data coming in from the Institute for Supply Management and other surveys is a bit less negative than anticipated, but continues to deteriorate in a manner that is consistent with stagnation. Still, with the S&P 500 at a Shiller P/E of more than 21, and Hussman's own measures indicating an estimated 10-year total return for the S&P 500 in the low 5 percent area, it is clear that investors have priced in a much more robust recovery than is likely to occur.
Not Yet Out of the Woods
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
While we know the Economic Cycle Research Institute data has deteriorated further since June, we won't have GDP figures for a while yet. Given the data in hand, it's clear that past growth downturns of the same extent have often gone on to become recessions. The bulk of the growth that we did observe coming off of the June 2009 economic low was driven by a burst of stimulus spending coupled with a variety of programs to pull economic activity forward. These synthetic factors are now trailing off, with little intrinsic economic activity to propel a recovery.
Sequential Signals
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The U.S. economy is still in a normal 'lag window' between deterioration in leading measures of economic activity and (probable) deterioration in coincident measures. Though the lags are sometimes variable, as we saw in 1974 and 2008, normal lags would suggest an abrupt softening in the September ISM report (due in the beginning of October), with new claims for unemployment climbing beginning somewhere around mid-October. If we look at the drivers of economic growth outside of the now fading impact of government stimulus spending, we continue to observe little intrinsic activity.
Impulse Response
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The next three months represent the most serious window for the U.S. economy and labor market. The typical 23-26 week lag between leading indicator deterioration and new unemployment claims deterioration suggests that we may observe upward pressure on new claims for unemployment beginning about mid-October. However, these lags can be somewhat variable, and the leading indicators tend to have a better correlation with price fluctuations in the securities market. By the time the coincident economic evidence is clear, securities markets have often completed a large portion of their adjustment.
The Recognition Window
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Over the course of the market cycle, one of the primary areas of risk for stocks (and conversely, one of the best periods for Treasury bonds) is typically the 'recognition window' where economic activity begins to deviate from the upward trend that is priced into the market, and investors begin to recognize that an economic downturn is, in fact, likely. The instant relief provoked by the manufacturing purchasing managers index and the employment report was an overreaction to data that is still very early in that window.
Hussman Funds 2010 Annual Report
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
At present valuations, exposure to market and credit risk is not likely to be well-compensated over the long-term, and may be associated with substantial losses in the intermediate term. Recent advances may simply be the product of a fragile post-crisis bounce, similar to those following other historical credit crises in the U.S. and abroad. The quarters immediately ahead present the greatest risk of fresh credit strains and concentrated economic risk.
Why Quantitative Easing Is Likely to Trigger a Collapse of the U.S. Dollar
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
A week ago, the Federal Reserve initiated a new quantitative easing program, purchasing U.S. Treasury securities and paying for those securities by creating billions of dollars in new monetary base. Treasury bond prices surged. With the U.S. economy weakening, this second round of quantitative easing appears likely to continue. Unfortunately, the unintended side effect of this policy shift is likely to be an abrupt collapse of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar.
A Fragile Economic Outlook Continues
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The recent few quarters of economic expansion are the result of enormous fiscal and monetary stimulus, without much 'intrinsic' private sector expansion at all. Now that inventories are replenished and the fiscal stimulus is tapering off, the underlying and still uncorrected fragility in the economy is likely to reassert itself for a time. While the Economic Cycle Research Institute has expressed increasing economic concerns, however, it has not yet warned conclusively of a double-dip.
Corporate 'Cash' - Cheering the Asset and Ignoring the Liability
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
There is a lot of apparent 'cash on the sidelines' because the government and many corporations have issued enormous quantities of new debt, often with short maturities, while other corporations have purchased it. It will remain on the sidelines until the debt is retired. The government debt has been issued to finance deficit spending. At the same time, a great deal of corporate debt has been issued over the past year apparently as a pre-emptive measure against the possibility of the capital markets freezing up again.
Valuing the S&P 500 Using Forward Operating Earnings
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
It is impossible to properly estimate long-term cash flows based on a single year of earnings. It is also impossible to properly value the stock market based on a single year of earnings. If you are not looking at a 'valuation' methodology accompanied by long-term, decade-by-decade evidence showing that the valuation method is actually correlated with subsequent market returns (particularly over a horizon of say, 7-10 years), then you are not looking at the sound valuation work of an investment professional.
Betting on a Bubble, Bracing For a Fall
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Investors who will need to fund specific expenses within a short number of years - retirement needs, tuition, health care, home purchases etc. - should not be relying on a continued market advance. If your life plans would be significantly derailed by a major market decline, get out. In contrast, if you are pursuing a disciplined, long-term investment strategy, and you know from your own experience of the past decade that you are diversified enough to ride out periodic losses without abandoning that strategy, ignore my views (and those of everyone else) and stick to your discipline.
Don't Take the Bait
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Investors who allow Wall Street to convince them that stocks are generationally cheap at current levels are like trout - biting down on the enticing but illusory bait of operating earnings, unaware of the hook buried inside. We should be skeptical about valuation metrics built on forward operating earnings and other measures that implicitly require U.S. profit margins to sustain levels about 50 percent above their historical norms indefinitely. More sober and historically reliable measures of market valuation create a much more challenging picture.
Misallocating Funds
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The relative abundance of physical and educational capital has been a driver of U.S. prosperity for generations, and is the main reason why American workers earn more than their counterparts in the developing world. Neither advantage in capital, however, is intrinsic to American workers, and it will be impossible to prevent a long-term convergence of U.S. wages toward those of developing countries unless the U.S. efficiently allocates its resources to productive investment and educational quality.
Implications of a Likely Economic Downturn
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Instead of directing savings toward investments in real, productive assets that we would observe as physical output, fixed capital, and equipment (and claims on those assets in the form of corporate stocks and bonds), our economy has been forced to choke down a massive issuance of government liabilities in order to bail out bad debt. For every dollar of debt that should have defaulted, we now have two dollars of debt outstanding: the original debt, and a newly issued government security. What appears to be 'sideline cash' is simply the evidence of past spending.
Recession Warning
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Warning: the US economy appears to be headed into a second round of decline. Looking at lessons learned across countries and centuries, Dr. John P. Hussman argues that that ?the economy is again turning lower, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the U.S. stock market will ultimately violate its March 2009 lows before the current adjustment cycle is complete.? The current argument that this outcome is ?unthinkable? is not evidence but rather reflects reliance upon incomplete data and narrow-minded perspectives.
Cliffhanger
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
If one thinks of the data as telling a story, the picture here would be a cliffhanger - where our hero dangles from a steep precipice, clutching a rock of uncertain strength, and the evidence is not clear about which outcome will prevail. One possible outcome is continuity, and the other is abrupt change. It's possible that things will resolve well, but we have to consider the possibility that they will not. Investors should make sure that a significant market decline would not derail their financial security or future plans, or cause them to abandon their discipline after the fact.
Born on Third Base
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Wall Street seems to have no idea that every bit of growth we've observed over the past year can be traced to government deficit spending, with zero private sector expansion when those deficits are factored out. Unless the credit spreads, the S&P 500, or the yield curve reverse, a further decline in the Purchasing Managers Index to 54 or below would be sufficient to confirm a 'double-dip recession.' By itself, such a level might not be particularly troublesome. In concert with other evidence, however, it would be sufficient to complete the syndrome of risk factors.
Extraordinarily Large Band-Aids
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
The fundamental problem with the global economy today is that we have not accepted the word 'restructuring' into our dialogue. Instead, we have allowed our policymakers to borrow and print extraordinarily large band-aids to temporarily cover an open wound that will not heal until we close the gap. That gap is the difference between the face value of debt securities and the actual cash flows available to service them. The way to close the gap is to restructure the debt. This will require those who made the bad loans to accept the associated losses.
Oil and Red Ink
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
It's no longer reasonable to apply previous risk estimates even after we've observed a major disaster. Before the housing crisis, it might have been tempting to shrug off mortgage defaults as relatively isolated events, since the price of housing had generally experienced a long upward trend over time. Indeed, historically, sustained declines in home prices could be shown to be very low probability events. But as the bubble continued, investors made little attempt to assess the probability of a debt crisis.
Don't Mess With Aunt Minnie
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
In medicine, an Aunt Minnie is a particular set of symptoms that is distinctly characteristic of a specific disease, even if each of the individual symptoms might be fairly common. Last week, we observed an Aunt Minnie featuring a collapse in market internals that has historically been associated with sharply negative market implications. Historically, we can identify 19 instances in the past 50 years where the weekly data featured broadly negative internals, coupled with at least 3-to-1 negative breadth, and a leadership reversal.
Two Choices: Restructure Debts or Debase Currencies
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Without a central taxing authority, the common European currency can only survive if participating countries strictly control their deficits. It should not be difficult to recognize that confidence in any currency is tied to confidence in the assets which stand behind it, and associated confidence in the restraint of fiscal and monetary authorities. The bureaucrats in both the U.S. and European central banks have chosen to betray that trust.
Greek Debt and Backward Induction
by John P. Hussman of Hussman Funds,
Despite the potential for a short burst of relief, the broader concern about deficits in the euro area make it unlikely that global investors will be appeased by a large bailout of Greece, or will go forward on the assumption that all is back to normal once that happens. Looking at the current state of the world economy, the underlying reality remains little changed: There is more debt outstanding than is capable of being properly serviced. Hussman also comments on overbought equity markets, and the current market climate.
Results 451–500
of 519 found.
