US President Donald Trump did not take office as a committed multilateralist. But even a president committed to putting “America first” now seems to recognize – at least with respect to NATO – that a framework through which countries can pursue shared goals is not a bad thing.

As US President Donald Trump proceeds to destabilize the post-war global economic order, much of the world is collectively holding its breath. While Trump's supporters defend the economic rationale of his actions, most economists view abdication of US global leadership as a historic mistake.

Expectations of stimulus, lower taxes, and deregulation might boost the US economy and the stock market’s performance in the short term. But US President Donald Trump's inconsistent, erratic, and destructive policies will take a heavy toll on domestic and global economic growth in the long run.

After a decade of deflationary pressure, central banks will probably not overreact if inflation overshoots their targets in the near term. In fact, there is now growing support for higher inflation targets, to give central banks more space to lower interest rates in the event of a future recession.

Donald Trump’s economic policies are likely to produce higher US inflation and interest rates, and more dollar appreciation, than financial markets expect. But Europe could stabilize after France's presidential election, ushering in a period of healthy economic growth and strong financial performance.

The retreat of the advanced economies from regional and global institutions has received a lot of attention lately. But while the destabilization of multilateral economic and financial structures could be particularly devastating for developing countries, the entire global economy will be adversely affected if the trend continues.

While few anticipated the British vote to leave the EU and Donald Trump's election as US president, neither outcome should have been all that surprising: disaffected voters were rejecting economic models that had produced high levels of inequality. The question now is what will replace those models.

The Trump administration's China-bashing strategy is based on the mistaken belief that a newly muscular US has all the leverage in dealing with its presumed adversary, and that any Chinese response is hardly worth considering. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Speculative markets have always been vulnerable to illusion, and in the US, two have been sustaining asset-price gains since November's presidential election. But seeing the folly in markets provides no clear advantage in forecasting outcomes, because changes in the force of an illusion are difficult to predict.

It is a post-financial-crisis myth that austerity-minded conservative governments always favor fiscal prudence while redistribution-oriented progressives view large deficits as the world’s biggest free lunch. This simplistic perspective badly misses the true underlying political economy of deficits.

Understanding the political success of US President-elect Donald Trump is not easy, and there have been many glib comparisons with earlier populist US politicians, from Huey Long to George Wallace. But the most revealing comparison may be with an historical figure from another country: the British nativist firebrand Enoch Powell.

While it is quite plausible to expect that Dona'd Trump’s incoming US administration will want to reverse the dollar’s climb, it is equally plausible that no other major economy will help. If the strong dollar prompts intervention in currency markets in 2017, the most likely scenario is one in which the US intervenes alone.

Open societies are in crisis, and various forms of closed societies – from fascist dictatorships to mafia states – are on the rise. Because elected leaders failed to meet voters’ legitimate expectations and aspirations, electorates have become disenchanted with the prevailing versions of democracy and capitalism.

At a time when the US is poised to turn inward, China’s economic performance is more important globally than ever. Whether China can achieve sustainable growth patterns in the coming years will depend on several key factors, the most important being internal

Donald Trump's use of foreign trade as a lightning rod in his presidential campaign is not an uncommon tactic for candidates at either end of the political spectrum. What is unusual is that he has not moderated his anti-trade tone since winning, despite the potentially disastrous consequences for the US and the world.

When a particular model of capitalism is working successfully, material progress relieves political pressures. But, as we saw in 2016, when the economy fails – and the failure is not just a transient phase but a symptom of deep contradictions – capitalism’s disruptive social side effects can turn politically toxic.

With Republicans holding majorities in both houses of Congress, US President-elect Donald Trump should have a relatively clear road ahead to implement his domestic economic agenda. But if Trump is to deliver the high growth he has promised, he will have to overcome external barriers as well.

There really is no silver lining to the cloud that now hangs over the US and the world. As bad as President-elect Donald Trump's administration will be for America’s economy and workers, its policies on climate change, human rights, the media, and ensuring peace and security are likely to be no less damaging for everyone else.

The year 2017 will mark the 40th anniversary of the publication of John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Age of Uncertainty. But if Galbraith were writing the same book in 2017, he probably would call the 1970s the Age of Assurance.

Exactly how much US President-elect Donald Trump’s policies will raise output and inflation will depend on how close the US economy is to full capacity.

Since the end of World War II, the hierarchy of economic priorities has been relatively clear: build a prosperous and open world order first, then try to generate inclusive and sustainable national growth patterns. Now, a reversal seems to be underway, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy.

With the Republican Party in full control of the US government, fiscal stimulus will boost economic growth in the short term. But enacting large tax cuts and boosting public spending in an economy already nearing full employment implies accelerating inflation, higher interest rates, or probably some combination of the two.

Since Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election, stock markets have rallied and the dollar has soared. Explaining these unforeseen market responses could provide a glimpse into what the next few months hold in store for the US economy.

The US president-elect's economic strategy is severely flawed: its protectionist bias collides head-on with the imperative of increased US reliance on foreign saving and trade deficits in order to sustain economic growth. A saving-short, protectionist America is a country on a path to nowhere.

In Italy’s December 4 referendum, voters will approve or reject the country’s most extensive constitutional reforms since the monarchy was abolished at the end of World War II.

US President-elect Donald Trump campaigned in part on a proposal to cut taxes dramatically for those with high incomes, a group whose members often have elite educations as well. So why did his most enthusiastic support tend to come from those with average and stagnating incomes and low levels of education? What gives?

If the US Federal Reserve becomes too hawkish too soon, it will strengthen the US dollar, undermining Donald Trump’s stated goal of creating jobs and boosting incomes for his blue-collar base. Given his proposed fiscal expansion, Trump would be better off keeping Barack Obama's dovish appointees.

Determining causality in economics may be elusive, but in the case of world trade it is clear: slower growth is the result of slower global GDP growth, not the other way around. And slower growth in international flows of financial capital may be just what the global economy needs.

Donald Trump’s astonishing victory in the US presidential election has made one thing abundantly clear: too many Americans – particularly white male Americans – feel left behind. Unfortunately, he is unlikely to pursue the policy agenda his voters need.

Donald Trump is a businessman who relishes the “art of the deal,” so he is by definition more of a pragmatist than a blinkered ideologue. Once in office, he will throw symbolic red meat to his blue-collar supporters, while reverting to the same supply-side, trickle-down economic policies that Republicans have favored for decades.

Markets nowadays are fixated on how high the US Federal Reserve will raise interest rates in the next 12 months. This is dangerously shortsighted: the real concern ought to be how far it could cut rates in the next deep recession.

It took a long time for widening inequality to have an impact on politics, as it suddenly has done in recent years. Now that it is a central issue, national economic priorities will need to shift substantially to create more equitable, inclusive societies, or electorates could embrace explosive political alternatives.

With its debt overhangs and property bubbles, its zombie state-owned enterprises and struggling banks, China is increasingly portrayed as the next disaster in a crisis-prone global economy. If the China bears are right, no country would be spared.

Despite the broad global trend toward more flexibility in exchange-rate policy and freer movement of capital across national borders, many countries are lacking dollars. Indeed, in many developing countries, the only thriving market for the past two years or so has been the black market for foreign exchange.

The relationship between politics and economics is changing. Advanced-country politicians are locked in bizarre, often exceptionally hostile conflicts, instead of acting on a growing economic consensus about how to escape a prolonged period of low and unequal growth.