A Cycle of Reset

Private markets benefited enormously from the post-Great Financial Crisis era of ultralow interest rates that stretched through much of the 2010s and into the early 2020s. Amid regulatory change and muted returns in traditional fixed income during this time, investors were increasingly pushed into alternative areas of capital markets in search of yield. Private credit, in particular, emerged as a favored destination for institutional capital, including pensions, endowments, and insurers. The sheer volume of capital entering the space created competitive pressures that, in hindsight, were distinctly late cycle. Spreads compressed, underwriting standards loosened in some segments, leverage crept higher, and growth at any cost became a dominant objective for many managers. In many cases, deals were structured under assumptions that financing would remain cheap, and refinancing would be readily available. As liquidity ebbs and rates normalize at higher levels, those assumptions will undoubtedly be tested.

It is important to note, however, that acknowledging excesses and the existence of a credit cycle does not mean the private market asset class is structurally impaired. Credit cycles are not a flaw of the system; they are a feature of it. Periods of easy money tend to inflate asset prices and encourage excess risk-taking, while tighter financial conditions reassert discipline, reset valuations, and reward selectivity. We are clearly in that phase today. While additional adjustment and some degree of further pain appear likely, overall loss rates in private credit remain low by historical standards. Even if defaults were to triple from current levels, they would still represent a relatively small portion of total assets under management. What is changing is not the viability of the asset class, but the degree of differentiation between truly skilled managers and mediocre ones.

credit cycle

Every cyclical credit downturn acts as a stress test. Managers who prioritized asset growth, overly concentrated in specific sectors, stretched covenants, or relied on optimistic refinancing assumptions will find the current environment less forgiving. By contrast, firms that maintain conservative leverage, disciplined underwriting, and robust downside protections are entering this phase from a position of strength. This will be especially relevant for vintages that originated in 2020 and 2021. Many of those loans are now approaching refinancing windows in a materially higher-rate world, compressing interest coverage ratios and exposing weaker capital structures. Yet this is precisely how cycles are supposed to work. Capital becomes scarcer, pricing power returns to lenders, and prudent risk management is rewarded.