RGE Monitor

Given political and fiscal constraints and banks' unwillingness to lend, it is doubtful that policy can prevent a double-dip. Even if a new round of monetary and quantitative easing can provide limited stimulus, the real issue facing the U.S. is the need for balance sheet deleveraging and repair, and that will be a multi-year process. The U.S. must brace itself for a long period of below-potential growth.

Turkey's current account deficit is unlikely to show a sustainable decrease without significant reforms. This means country needs to keep attracting sufficient capital flows from abroad to finance the shortfall. Increasing short-term capital flows, however, are raising Turkey's vulnerability to sudden shifts in global risk appetite. The danger is that an increase in risk aversion could place upward pressure on interest rates to attract the necessary external financing.

The Fed has been laying the verbal groundwork for further monetary stimulus. The August 10 announcement by the Federal Open Market Committee appears to be another signal of a gradual policy shift. On its own, the latest move is likely to have limited implications for the broader economy. More importantly, however, the decision to reinvest the repayments in Treasury bonds reflects the preference many FOMC members have expressed for an expeditious return to the Fed's traditional Treasury security-only portfolio.

Something other than leaves will fall in Europe this autumn. American attention, no doubt, will focus on Barack Obama's date with an angry electorate this November. Yet across the pond, governments of the right, left and center in Europe appear ready to crumble, their positions eroded by a wave of austerity and high unemployment and government debt, plus a smattering of nasty corruption scandals.

The global adjustment process has been delayed. In order to support growth and income generation, the over-saving investment- and export-driven nations - China, emerging Asia, Germany and Japan - continue to look to the overspending countries following an Anglo-Saxon model. There is a risk of a weak recovery of global aggregate demand relative to supply, which could contribute to deflationary pressures. As such, the recovery will continue to be multi-speed and rocky, exit strategies will remain uncoordinated and the risk of policy gridlock is high.

According to the Committee of European Bank Supervisors, only seven of the continent's banks failed to pass muster out of the 91 assessed in recent stress tests. These tests contained a crucial flaw, however: the absence of a sovereign default scenario. Optimistic commentators point to the rebound in U.S. markets after the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, which faced significant criticism, as Europe's equivalent is now. However, while the U.S. SCAP tests modeled the key concern of the market - future property risk - and forced banks to recapitalize, the European tests did neither.

Why aren't we giddy about gold? In the abstract, gold is most attractive as a hedge in one of three extreme scenarios: high inflation, persistent deflation, or when the risk of global financial meltdown is large. Once national balance sheets are repaired through a protracted and gradual deleveraging of households and governments following the relatively rapid deleveraging of the financial sectors, particularly in the United States, excessive deflation and inflation fears will subside.

In 2009 and the first half of 2010, low interest rates and an uncertain global outlook led to strong, volatile capital inflows into some of Asia's most promising economies. Policymakers in these places - which include, among others, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia and India - need to tighten monetary policy sooner rather than later. New inflows from the rest of the world might prove problematic, but at present low or negative real interest rates seem to be fueling speculative investment by domestic players, and that too is a dangerous dynamic.

The most recent U.S. employment report was even worse than we thought it would be, less because headline employment retreated (this was expected due to Census layoffs) than because weekly hours worked, average hourly earnings, and private sector payroll gains all took a plunge. The second half of the year should bring even weaker growth as personal consumption growth aligns with income growth, inventory growth aligns with final sales (still a weak spot) and fiscal stimulus turns neutral or becomes a drag on growth.

One of the major issues is whether the problems of the PIIGS will metastasize from the eurozone periphery into the ?core? countries of the continent. This commentary focuses specifically on Belgium, which has the third highest debt-to-GDP ratio in Europe. It is uncertain how Belgium?s necessary belt-tightening measures can be implemented, particularly given the dim prospects of a durable political consensus.

Even if the Chinese authorities allow two-way movement of the yuan against the dollar to reduce speculation, Chinese policies could support the U.S. Treasury market, commodities and risky assets more generally - especially if other emerging market countries take a cue from China and allow only gradual depreciation. However, a sharp appreciation against the euro and dollar without other policies to support Chinese consumption could contribute to much slower global growth and higher inflation as increased Chinese production costs are transmitted to G10 consumers.

Although the short-term gains from hosting the World Cup are rather limited, if the event goes well and the country avoids labor strikes and other destabilizing events, it could provide a chance for South Africa to showcase its institutional development and help cement its longer-term recovery. There are, however, several structural challenges to overcome, such as limited access to services, transportation bottlenecks, worsening demographics and extensive inequality, which could hamper the country's potential output growth.

While Hungary may not be 'another Greece,' the country's government announced an economic action plan last week aimed at reining in public finances amidst growing investor concern. The plan includes a special bank tax, public sector spending cuts, a cut in the corporate tax rate, and a recommendation to ban foreign exchange-denominated mortgage lending. It's unclear, however, that this plan will be enough for Hungary to reduce its deficit to meet this year's 3.8 percent of GDP target agreed upon with the IMF.

While reforms like eliminating the 'too-big-to-fail' card and adopting Glass-Steagall-like regulations to unbundle different types of financial activity are necessary to ward off asset bubbles and combat systemic risks, they might not be feasible for political reasons. In the event of a Glass-Steagall type separation, we would expect a divergence in credit spreads between banks with and without insured deposits, but expect the cost of credit for depository institutions to be very close to sovereign risk. On the flip side, dilution risk would be concentrated in depository institutions.

Global trade growth is unlikely to reach its pre-recession highs in the short term, with exports of several trade-dependent economies, particularly emerging markets, growing at a slower pace due to weaker import demand in the U.S. and EU amidst consumer deleveraging, fiscal austerity and slow recoveries in labor markets and household wealth. In the medium term, however, structural reforms in emerging markets and surplus countries to increase domestic demand will boost trade among emerging markets, as well as global trade flows, changing their direction and composition.